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FOUR REPLIES 
How do leaders of the financial industry view the nation's 
capital needs? Spokesmen from commercial banking, investment 
banking, savings and loan, and insurance discuss the causes 
and implications of a potential shortage and the problems 
their industry faces in helping maintain a flourishing economy. 
COMMERCIAL BANKING: 
THE TWIN THREATS TO CAPITAL 
by W. L I D D O N McPETERS, President, American Bankers Association 
and President, Security Bank of Cor inth, Mississippi 
The question of whether or not our 
nation is heading for a capita! short-
age is an exceedingly complex one. In 
this issue of TEMPO, Dr. Freund deals 
with the question in an especially 
lucid way. The concerns which he has 
expressed from his vantage point in 
the securities industry are widely 
shared in commercial banking. 
About one-fourth of the total 
credit outstanding in our economy 
comes directly from the more than 
14,000 banks in our nation's commer-
cial banking system. Moreover, a sig-
nificant amount of the credit provided 
by several other types of lenders is 
supported, in part, by bank loans and 
commitments. 
Commercial banking's contribu-
tion to the annual supply of new 
credit fluctuates from year to year, of 
course, but over a decade or so, it will 
tend to expand its holdings of debt 
securities and loans at about the same 
pace that total debt has grown in our 
economy. 
Federal Fiscal Policy 
This year-to-year fluctuation in the 
volume of credit extended by com-
mercial banks is primarily the result of 
(1) changes in the demand for credit 
by individuals, businesses, and gov-
ernments and (2) shifts in Federal 
Reserve monetary policy. The availa-
bility of bank credit depends on the 
ease or tightness of the latter. 
Dr. Freund's emphasis on the 
important influence of the federal 
government in determining whether 
or not our nation may experience a 
capital shortage is well placed. A 
deficit in the federal budget has 
important implications with respect 
to the demand and supply of capital. 
(1) A federal deficit tends to result 
in a higher level of spending on 
consumption than would exist if 
federal revenues and expenditures 
were in balance. That is, the total of 
taxes and current savings is less than it 
should be in relation to total income 
in the economy. (2) In financing the 
deficit, the federal government at-
tracts funds away from capital forma-
tion in the private sector. Federal 
deficits thus tend to reduce the 
supply of capital, while at the same 
time increasing the demand for it. 
They have been a major source of 
inflation in our economy. 
The proper and principal use of 
money is (he consumption and 
alienation of it, whereby it is 
expended in making purchases. 
Therefore, in itself, it is unlawful 
to receive a price for the use of 
money lent, which is called 
—ST. THOMAS ACQUINAS 
Because the anti-inflationary weap-
ons of fiscal policy are usually po-
litically unpalatable, the burden of 
combatting inflation has fallen mainly 
on Federal Reserve monetary policy. 
The result has been recurrent periods 
of tight money over the past 20 years. 
Since this policy is implemented 
largely by curtailing the expansion of 
bank credit, the commercial banks 
and their customers have been sub-
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jected to recurrent swings in the 
availability of credit. Such swings 
have contr ibuted to instability in the 
pace of capital formation. 
The most important step that can 
be taken to help assure a stable pace 
of capital growth is for the federal 
government to put its fiscal house in 
order. Budget deficits should be 
permitted or encouraged only in 
periods of recession. Conversely, and 
wi th total determination, budget 
surpluses should be achieved in 
periods of expansion. 
Inflation 
The 1974-1975 recession differed in at 
least one important respect f rom the 
other recessions that our economy 
has experienced since the end of 
Wor ld War II. In the fourth quarter of 
1973, disposable personal income in 
real terms stopped rising and began 
to decline. The reason was that the 
purchasing power of the dollar was 
being eroded by inflation more 
rapidly than the increase in number 
of dollars received in after-tax per-
sonal income. This decline in real 
purchasing power continued into 
early 1975, and it was not unti l the 
early months of 1976 that disposable 
personal income in real terms re-
gained the level of late 1973. 
When real purchasing power de-
clines, it contributes directly to the 
severity of a recession, since it 
reduces the consumer's ability to take 
goods off the market. This, in turn , 
weakens incentives for businesses to 
expand plant and equipment. The 
economy thus receives a sharp "one -
t w o " punch. 
During previous postwar reces-
sions, consumer spending was not 
constrained by declines in personal 
income. Indeed, expansion in con-
sumer spending helped to bring the 
recessions to an early end and to 
encourage business spending on 
plant and equipment. This balance 
between consumption spending and 
investment spending thus maintained 
a capital formation commensurate 
wi th our nation's requirements. This 
balance was disrupted by the 1973-
1974 inflation and ensuing recession. 
In part, the present concern about 
a future capital shortage in our nation 
reflects the fact that an appropriate 
balance between consumption 
spending and investment spending 
has not yet been restored. As Dr. 
Freund has indicated, continuing 
expansion in consumption spending, 
with the currently relatively low level 
of investment spending, implies that 
"bot t lenecks" wil l sooner or later be 
encountered in the production of 
goods and services. Economic re-
covery could thus be disrupted. 
The commercial banking system is 
fully capable of playing its well estab-
lished role as a major supplier of 
credit to individuals, businesses, and 
governments. There is strong evi-
dence that the trend toward greater 
reliance on savings and time deposits 
as a future source of deposit growth 
in commercial banks wil l continue. 
However, the commercial banks do 
ask when they wil l be freed from the 
competit ive disadvantage of the 
savings account interest rate dif-
ferentials imposed by federal law and 
regulation. Unti l then, they wi l l 
achieve less than their potential as 
suppliers of credit. 
We need more incentives for 
expanding our industrial capacity. 
The need goes beyond short-term 
policy measures. What is needed is a 
clear assurance that our economy is 
again on a steady growth path. 
The capital requirements of our 
economy over the coming decade 
are, indeed, very large. And while I 
believe our economy has the capacity 
to meet them, I f ind that the greatest 
threat to our nation's ability to meet 
its capital requirements is irresponsi-
ble federal fiscal policy and inflation. 
INVESTMENT BANKING: 
THE RESTRAINTS ON CAPITAL 
by ROBERT M . F O M A N , President and Ch ie f Execut ive O f f i ce r , 
E.F. H u t t o n & Co. , Inc. 
Wil l there be a capital shortage? The 
issues are complex. Certainly an 
actual capital shortage wil l be more a 
funct ion of economics and politics 
than of anything the securities indus-
try does or does not do. Indeed, the 
assumptions underlying the capital 
shortage thesis are being challenged 
by serious thinkers. The economists 
who raised the question may have 
created another one of those eco-
nomictrendsthathave nowheretogo. 
Capital shortage or not, invest-
ments which are attractive in relation 
to the prevailing economic and social 
environment wil l attract investors. 
The key issues center not on security 
industry resources, but rather on the 
elimination of those forces which 
dampen returns and increase uncer-
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tainty, thereby reducing the attrac-
tiveness of investments. 
For example, many companies now 
invest fewer total dollars because 
they have raised their rate-of-return 
requirements. These requirements 
had to be raised to adjust for the 
effects of inf lat ion, economic uncer-
tainty, and political ambiguity. How-
ever, while the increasing rate-of-
return requirement eliminates low 
return investments and reduces the 
capital shortage problem, if indeed 
there is one, it certainly does not 
bode well for our economy. 
Moreover, much current invest-
ment spending is either non-
productive or marginally produc-
tive. For example, the government 
mandated "qual i ty of l i fe" invest-
ments. Less of what we call capital in-
The theologians, approaching 
the question from a legal point 
of view, made it possible for the 
bankers to invest their money 
profitably by switching from 
lending to exchange. . . . Since a 
c a m b i u m (exchange contract) 
was not a straight loan, there was 
no usury involved. 
—RAYMOND DE ROOVER 
vestment is now capital investment in 
the classical sense. Some observers 
estimate that these mandated invest-
ments comprise as much as 25 per-
cent of the total. 
An overriding concern of the in-
vestment wor ld is that the social con-
sequences of, for example, greater 
unemployment—result ing from low-
er total investment—will focus undue 
attention on dealing with symptoms 
rather than on the fundamental eco-
nomic and political environment that 
is required for our system to work. 
Nobody, however, has yet f igured out 
how to satisfy both capital and labor 
with this trade-off. 
Nevertheless, whatever the envi-
ronment, vast amounts of per-
manent capital wi l l be required by 
American industry over the next 
decade, and the main responsibility 
for raising it belongs to the invest-
ment banking/brokerage community. 
America's ability to raise perma-
nent private capital for industry is 
clearly the best in the wor ld ; it has 
enabled this nation to continue to 
outpace its competitors in economic 
and industrial growth for decades. 
Helping to maintain this economic 
superiority has been the fact that the 
investor, whether individual or insti-
tu t ion, is far more likely to invest his 
funds in a corporation if he is secure 
in the knowledgethatthere wil l bean 
active, stable market into which he 
can sell in the future. Our capital-
raising process depends upon the 
liquidity of such a secondary market. 
The Institutional Investor 
The ever-increasing activity of the 
institutional investor in the equity 
markets, combined with the legis-
lated restrictions recently imposed on 
managers of pension monies by 
ERISA, have caused fundamental 
changes in this market. Pension fund 
managers must fol low extremely con-
servative courses in selecting invest-
ments, lest they run afoul of the ERISA 
laws. Investment results themselves 
become almost less important than 
being able to defend one's actions. 
Consequently, institutional invest-
ments have tended, in the equity 
markets, to go only to those stocks 
which are conservative, l iquid, wel l -
known, and owned by other institu-
tions. This tendency reduces the 
ability of small and medium-sized 
companies to gain market recogni-
t ion, which, in turn , reduces their 
ability to finance growth through the 
selling of equity. Unfortunately, these 
same companies are too small for the 
public debt markets. They also lack 
sufficient influence in periods of tight 
money, like 1974, to depend upon 
commercial banks to fulf i l l their 
financial needs. 
The Individual Investor 
Another major source of capital, the 
individual investor, believing that his 
money wil l be safer and more pro-
ductive in the same havens chosen by 
the well-publicized institutions, has 
gone more and more toward the 
same kinds of equity securities. The 
result for the smaller company is less 
liquidity and fewer investors—not a 
good atmosphere for emerging com-
panies to raise and attract investment 
capital. 
This same individual investor, 
whose individual decisions aggre-
gate to make our capital markets 
vastly superior to those of other 
countries, has other factors working 
against his willingness to invest d i -
rectly in corporate America. Most of 
these factors result f rom congres-
sional and executive branch actions. 
First, the tax structure, which has 
always favored capital investment, is 
now undergoing reforms, many of 
which disfavor capital investment. For 
example, the 1976 tax legislation 
extends the holding period that is re-
quired to qualify for long-term capital 
gains treatment. Further, the Demo-
crats have suggested doing away with 
the capital gains tax treatment and 
taxing all capital gains, long or short 
term, as unearned income. Each of 
these changes wil l make equity in-
vestment by individuals less attrac-
tive, just when more rather than less 
individual investment is required. 
Moreover, the constant promul-
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gation of more complex accounting 
policies by the accounting profes-
sion and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has bewildered the 
unsophisticated investor to the point 
where he is unable to understand 
corporate financial statements. The 
changes, which were made in the 
interest of greater disclosure, have 
resulted in a plethora of " n o n -
recurr ing" gains and losses, balance 
sheets whose footnotes are far length-
ier than the financial statements 
themselves, and income statements 
whose true meaning is often hidden 
somewhere between the lines. The 
investor understands good news and 
he understands bad news, but what 
he cannot understand at all he is likely 
to avoid altogether. 
For these and other reasons, there 
has been a noticeable shrinkage in 
the number of total individual share-
holders in this country since 1968. If 
this element of our capital formation 
process deteriorates further, the 
problems of raising sufficient capital 
over the next decade, as enumerated 
by Dr. Freund and other economists, 
may, indeed, become a problem. 
Even with the alleged capital short-
age, however, the giant corporations 
of this nation wil l retain their access to 
sufficient capital for their needs, 
though at times it may be very expen-
sive. As the institutional pools of 
capital continue to grow, through 
increasing pension contributions and 
an already evident return to more 
normal saving patterns, these funds 
wil l be put to work primarily through 
debt and equity investment in the 
largest and "safest" corporations. 
Whether the other significant parts 
of our capitalist system, the small and 
medium-sized corporations, wi l l be 
able to finance growth wil l depend 
primarily on the attitudes of indi-
vidual investors. Constant publicity of 
corporate indiscretions, tax legis-
lation favoring consumption over in-
vestment, bewildering financial state-
ments, and gyrating, unpredictable 
markets are slowly destroying the in-
dividual's confidence in the process. 
Whether we can regain this conf i -
dence depends primarily on the atti-
tudes and actions of our govern-
ment. Congress and the President can 
bring the individual investor back. 
They should. We need him now, and 
we wil l need him even more in the 
years to come. 
SAVINGS AND LOAN: 
THE COMPETITION FOR AVAILABLE CAPITAL 
by Preston M a r t i n , President and Ch ie f Executive Of f i ce r , PMI M o r t g a g e Insurance Co . 
o 
In his provocative article, Wil l iam 
Freund points out that, whi le the 
recession has eased current capital 
requirements, savings f lowing into 
corporations through bond and stock 
purchases may be insufficient to fund 
required capital expenditures. 
In that event, housing wil l be 
competing with corporations for 
available savings in both the capital 
markets, through the issuance of 
mortgage-backed securities and 
bonds, and the real estate oriented 
savings institutions, through pass-
book and certificate savings. More-
over, housing wil l also compete for 
personal savings through down pay-
ments for homeownership and 
through the accompanying "issu-
ance" of mortgage debt to these same 
home purchasers. 
Competing Against Corporations 
How well wil l housing be able to 
compete in the next 10 years? Let us 
look first at mortgage-backed securi-
ties. In the late 1960's, federal housing 
policy officials examined housing 
finance markets and found that 
mortgages were becoming increas-
ingly unattractive to institutional 
investors compared to corporate 
bonds and stock. The mortgage was 
costly to originate, service, and 
foreclose. Courts were increasingly 
emphasizing borrower rights— 
sometimes even when contrary to the 
mortgage contract. Payments were in 
cumbersome denominations (e.g. 
$257.83 per month), included a both-
ersome monthly return of principal, 
were for a long contractual maturity 
wi th an unpredictable probabil ity of 
prepayment, and had a fixed interest 
rate. 
Is it any wonder that the pension 
fund or insurance company invest-
ment manager preferred to place a 
call to his investment broker for $1 
mil l ion of publicly traded corporate 
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bonds or to negotiate a high yielding 
private placement—perhaps with an 
equity kicker—or to buy common 
stock offering the prospect of both 
current dividend and price apprecia-
tion? As these diversified investors 
withdrew, the home mortgage mar-
ket was increasingly left to savings 
and loan associations and mutual 
savings banks. By the late 1960's, many 
mortgage bankers were f inding that 
Fannie Mae (The Federal National 
Mortgage Association) moved from 
being their best customer to being 
their only customer. 
The solution arrived at since 1969 
has been to make the mortgage look 
as much like a corporate bond as 
possible. First, the Federal Home 
Loan Banks began to sell large vol -
umes of consolidated obligations. In 
turn, these banks began to encour-
age their 4,000 plus members, mostly 
savings and loans, to borrow for 
expansion of their mortgage lending. 
Then Congress authorized the crea-
tion of the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation in 1970. The 
Mortgage Corporation (also called 
Freddie Mac) and Fannie Mae under-
took a landmark assignment, to 
create a uniform mortgage in-
strument. The Mortgage Corpora-
t ion and Fannie Mae began to issue 
bonds backed by the cash flows from 
pools of mortgages. The ability to 
service these bonds was guaranteed 
by the Government National Mor t -
gage Association (Ginnie Mae). Gin-
nie Mae also guaranteed securities 
issued by mortgage originators, 
where interest and principal were 
passed through to the investor, 
beginning in 1970. 
The Mortgage Corporation sold, 
through Wall Street, participations in 
the whole loans and mortgages which 
it held—also beginning in 1970. The 
Mortgage Corporation issued its 
Guaranteed Mortgage Certificates 
beginning in 1975. The GMCs are 
specifically designed to make the 
institutional investment manager feel 
all the comfort and convenience of 
owning a bond yet having the pro-
ceeds fund home mortgages. They 
are guaranteed by an issuer (The 
Mortgage Corporation) which is 
affiliated with the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System. 
Then, in 1975, the first public 
offering of a mortgage-backed bond 
by a savings and loan association 
came to market. As this was taking 
place, the old prohibit ions against 
We, the trustees of the sacred 
Monte della Pieta of Naples, 
certify that we hold on deposit in 
the said sacred bank to the credit 
of Lucretia da Beneme thirteen 
ducats which we guarantee will 
be paid to any party designated 
by her order at the bottom of 
this instrument, subject only to 
the return of this instrument 
signed in her hand and sealed 
with the accustomed seal of the 
said sacred bank. 
—A CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT, 1574 
originating or buying mortgages 
beyond 50 miles of the home office 
were removed for savings and loans 
and mutual savings banks. The Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
secured an IRS ruling facilitating the 
sale of mortgages whi le preserving 
the savings and loan tax status. Thus, 
encouraged, lenders began to trade 
mortgages and mortgage loan partic-
ipations. Mortgage bankers began 
to replace their lost insurance com-
pany correspondents with new sav-
ings and loan clients. Mortgage rates 
and mortgage funds availability be-
gan to behave as in a national market 
rather than a plethora of local mar-
kets. All of which helped make 
mortgages and mortgage-backed 
securities again competitive with 
corporate securities. 
Competing for Personal Savings 
The credit crunch of 1969-70 con-
vinced federal regulators of financial 
institutions and the savings officers of 
these institutions that the saving 
public was discovering Treasury bills 
and government and corporate 
bonds. 
But just as there needed to be a 
product for the institutional investor 
which kept funds in mortgage-
related securities, there needed to be 
a product which would keep savings 
on deposit in mortgage lending insti-
tutions—a product to stem disinter-
mediation. The 6 percent interest, 2 
year min imum maturity, $1,000 mini -
mum denomination certificate was 
introduced in 1969 to savings and 
loans (with commercial banks being 
authorized to pay 5% percent). 
The response must be judged as 
excellent. Since that time there have 
been authorized a whole series of 
certificates, ranging up to 7VA percent 
interest. Of the $295 bil l ion on 
deposit in savings and loans as of 
March 31,1976, fully 55 percent was in 
certificates—an amazing conversion 
in just over six years. The saving 
public has now fully accepted a 
federally insured certificate in a local 
thrift institution, with a specified 
maturity and penalty for early re-
dempt ion, that offers a good substi-
tute for Treasury securities and cor-
porate bonds. 
A Look Ahead 
What types of mortgage and savings 
product changes might occur be-
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tween now and 1985 to help compete 
with the corporate securities market? 
• Relatively soon, there are likely 
to be numerous pools of conven-
tional mortgages, privately insured 
and meeting pre-described stan-
dards, which maywel lbeopenended. 
Pool administrators wil l buy mort-
gages and issue debt and/or partici-
pations, like The Mortgage Corpora-
t ion now does. In some cases, thrift 
institutions wil l join together in 
offering mortgages to a given pool. 
Some pools wil l contain only variable 
rate mortgages; some wil l have low 
interest rate mortgages at deep 
discounts; some wil l have short 
remaining contract maturity or high 
probability of prepayment; and some 
wil l offer the individual investor the 
opportunity to buy or sell at net asset 
value, plus transaction costs—a mort-
gage mutual fund. 
• There wil l be much experi-
mentation with mortgages for young 
families whose income is expected to 
rise. These wil l take the form of 
variable payments, variable bal-
ances, lines of credit mortgages, cost 
of living mortgages, share of equity 
mortgages, and so on. For those 
retiring with l imited ability to make 
rising property tax and maintenance 
payments, there will be housing an-
nuities and perhaps sale-leaseback 
financing. 
On the savings side of the business, 
the success of certificates and the 
recent major moves by Congress to 
permit tax-deferred, individually tai-
lored pension plans wil l cause much 
new product development in savings 
instruments. Examples might be: 
• A certificate which pays a higher 
rate each year and that is held. Such 
an account in the name of an en-
tire family might encourage coop-
erative family saving, withdrawal by 
some family members on approval of 
the others, periodic gifting f rom 
those in high tax brackets to those in 
low brackets, and loans for home 
purchases f rom the family savings 
pool at whatever rate the family wants 
to charge its members. 
• Certificates with variable interest 
rates. In some states, there is a con-
venient f low from savings to checking 
account (or NOW account) to over-
drafting into a loan posture. On the 
West Coast, at least one institution 
permits using the equity bui lding up 
in one's home, as a result of a loan 
amortization and price appreciation, 
as a quasi-savings account with easy 
borrowing of that equity. 
• Counselor selling. Whi le some 
bemoan the issuance of low mini -
mum denomination debt by govern-
ment and fight to maintain spreads 
between accounts of competing 
types of thrift institutions, there 
appears to be plenty of room to 
attract personal savings by f inding out 
what the customer's problem is and 
then helping him or her solve it. 
Dr. Freund says there may be a 
capital shortage. If so, it would appear 
clear that thrift institutions and the 
housing market need not simply let 
corporations get all the savings they 
need at the expense of housing. 
Mr. Martin, former chairman of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(1969-1972) and the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(1969-1972) was assisted in the 
preparation of this article by 
R. Bruce Ricks. 
INSURANCE: THE COST OF FINANCING CAPITAL. 
by D O N A L D S. M a c N A U G H T O N , C h a i r m a n , Ch ie f Executive Of f i ce r , Prudent ia l Insurance C o . of Amer i ca 
Recent studies of the supply of capital 
have come full circle f rom the years 
after Wor ld War I I . Then, the pre-
dominant fear was that the supply of 
savings might be uncomfortably large 
relative to the demand for invest-
ment. Now, the earlier concern that 
aggregate demand might fall back to 
depression levels, if the government 
did not stimulate consumption rela-
tive to saving, has been replaced by 
fears that government policies have 
so stimulated consumption at the 
expense of saving that a capital 
shortage is in prospect. 
The consequences of this "capital 
gap" are high interest rates that 
continue to rise and a short-fall in 
sorely needed investment. The result 
is slower economic growth, increas-
ing inflation and rising unemploy-
ment in the years ahead. However, 
given today's conflicting evidence 
and interpretations it is difficult to 
judge whether or not such a capital 
shortage is likely during the next few 
years and beyond. And exaggeration 
of the capital gap idea can detract 
f rom thoughtful analysis and lead 
perhaps to adverse policy reactions. 
15 
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Three Criteria 
There are three aspects of the capital 
formation issue that deserve atten-
t ion. One is to distinguish more 
clearly between putt ing needed 
physical capital in place and supply-
ing the funds needed to finance 
capital additions—that is, to draw a 
clear distinction between a physical 
capital shortage and a financial capital 
shortage. This distinction is important 
because some commentators fear 
that the falling rate of return on the 
nation's invested capital may be a 
greater threat to future capital spend-
ing than a shortage of financing. 
A physical capital shortage (and a 
declining rate of return on invest-
ment capital) might result f rom a 
variety of causes: (1) reduced pro-
ductivity of capital stock reflecting 
the relatively advanced age of exist-
ing plants, the greater investment 
required for each barrel of offshore 
oi l , and the added costs to meet 
pol lut ion control and health and 
safety requirements; (2) excessive 
government regulation in such areas 
as apartment rents and oil and natural 
gas product ion and distr ibution; or 
(3) local resistance to investment in, 
say, electric generating plants. 
Second, even when the analysis is 
l imited to the financial capital short-
age, the " g a p " approach encounters 
formidable forecasting difficulties. 
The potential errors become quite 
large as the outlook period is ex-
tended, and even the most skilled 
forecasters are frustrated by changing 
consumer moods that affect future 
household savings. The capital short-
age models, further, may not give 
sufficient recognition to demand-
supply adjustments mandated by the 
operation of our price system. For 
example, the energy crisis reduced 
electric power demands and already 
has caused reassessment of invest-
ment requirements for electric gen-
erating capacity. Also, it is hard to 
separate the "object ive" forecast 
from the subjective social goals of the 
forecaster—i.e., the proper alloca-
tion of resources to investment versus 
consumption and to private versus 
public sectors. 
Finally, with respect to availability 
of f inancing, it seems to me that 
closing the " g a p " through excessive 
debt financing should cause as much 
concern, if not more, than the size of 
the projected capital gap. This issue is 
central to the increasing fragility of 
our financial system since the mid-
1960s. From the vantage point of the 
life insurance industry and our func-
t ion as financial intermediaries in-
volved in making long-term financial 
investments, the mix, as well as the 
amount, of future financial demand 
has an overwhelming significance. 
Defining the Term 
In my view, a capital shortage is best 
defined as a situation that emerges 
when a lack of physical investment 
prevents the economy from achiev-
ing and maintaining full employment 
at stable prices, and/or when the 
necessary f low of funds to finance 
capital investment is not for th-
coming at reasonably stable rates of 
interest. This latter case of a financial 
capital shortage produces a high and 
variable interest rate structure; and it 
results in a "crowding ou t " of some 
key economic sectors—for example, 
the newer and smaller businesses 
which contribute to the innovative 
and competit ive character of the 
economy. Indeed, with such debt 
burdens increasing—characterized 
by high debt-equity ratios and across-
the-board weakening in the quality of 
corporate balance sheets—the econ-
omy is less resilient and less likely to 
cope with either periodic external 
shocks or sudden severe shifts in 
internal economic policies. 
Defining a capital shortage in this 
way avoids the problems inherent in 
trying to quantify a so-called "capital 
gap." In these exercises, a big short-
fall almost inevitably develops, be-
cause available future financing is 
almost sure to be much less than a 
shopping list of the nation's invest-
ment aspirations. Indeed, this 
broader definit ion of the problem 
also emphasizes the point that the 
size of the projected capital gap is not 
nearly as important as are its implica-
tions for the future structure of 
interest rates and rates of inflation. As 
Dr. Freund points out, in actuality no 
such gap wil l occur, since prices and 
interest rates wil l move in a direction 
that wi l l equilibrate the supply of and 
the demand for funds. What is 
important is to relate the projections 
of the capital shortfall wi th the 
implied interest rate and price struc-
ture that wil l eliminate this gap. In 
In order to remedy 
inconveniences [of counterfeit 
coins], a [public] bank was 
established in 7609 under the 
guarantee of the City [of 
Amsterdam]. This bank received 
both foreign coins, and the light 
worn coin of the country at its 
real intrinsic value in the good 
standard money of the 
country. . . . It was at the same 
time enacted that all bills drawn 
upon or negotiated at 
Amsterdam of the value of 600 
guilders and upwards should be 
paid in bank money, which at 
once took away all uncertainty in 
the value of those bills. 
—ADAM SMITH 
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brief, to assess the seriousness of a 
shortfall requires determining 
whether or not the costs of financing 
increase too rapidly to insure finan-
cial and economic stability, and/or 
whether financing costs reach levels 
that are too high to maintain a fully 
employed labor force at stable prices. 
Going beyond definit ions, there is 
sufficient evidence based on past 
economic performance to be con-
cerned about the capital shortage 
problem. Based on my own com-
pany's experience as a major lender 
of long-term funds, I am struck by the 
seemingly huge capital outlays 
needed for achieving normal expan-
sion, as well as for replacing out-
moded and inefficient facilities, 
developing new sources of raw 
materials and energy, preserving the 
natural environment, improving 
worker safety, and expanding agricul-
tural product ion. I am also impressed, 
however, by the host of questions 
that challenge alarmist views and that 
have yet to be fully resolved. For 
example, whi le the dollar magnitudes 
of investment necessary to fully 
employ our labor force seem to be 
enormous, does the apparent decl in-
ing rate of return on capital suggest 
that we have on hand an excessive 
amount of capital stock in certain 
industries? Many have argued that 
economic policy seems to favor 
consumption over investment, which 
carries the implication that govern-
ment policy wil l hamper the financ-
ing of needed investment projects. 
How is this position reconciled with 
the fact that personal saving rates 
throughout the 1970's have been at 
historically high levels? 
Proponents of the capital shortage 
thesis have argued that increasing 
shares of GNP must go for invest-
ment; otherwise as the economy 
expands, capacity constraints wi l l be 
reached too quickly, once again 
/ have the honor to transmit an 
ordinance passed by the United 
States in Congress assembled the 
31st day of December, 1781, 
incorporating the subscribers of 
the Bank of North America. . . . 
It affords me great satisfaction to 
inform you that this [first 
national] Bank commenced its 
operations yesterday. 
—ROBERT MORRIS 
setting off inflation pressures. But, to 
what extent can we rely on our 
financial system to f ind new ways to 
shift capital to growth areas (such as 
energy requirements) where invest-
ment needs are greatest? 
New Research Projects 
It should be evident that the concept 
of a capital shortage and the empirical 
evidence brought to bear on the issue 
are sufficiently complex to require 
an in-depth analysis which is beyond 
the purpose of this article. I would 
note, however, that the life insurance 
industry, through its Investment 
Research Program conducted by the 
American Council of Life Insurance, 
anticipated the current concern 
about capital formation. In 1973, it 
commissioned a New York University 
group to project demand and supply 
conditions in the US capital markets 
out to 1985. The ful l results of this 
study wil l soon be available, but 
preliminary indications show that a 
number of "pressure points" wi l l 
bui ld up over the next decade. 
This work has led to a more recent 
comprehensive research effort, spon-
sored by the industry, to deal wi th the 
basic determinants of and motiva-
tions for capital formation and saving. 
This is an ambitious project. It wil l 
examine the nation's commitment to 
economic growth as necessary back-
ground in formulat ing capital invest-
ment and savings requirements; it 
wil l investigate the roles of govern-
ment, business, and private savings in 
the capital formation process. 
This article has dealt wi th technical 
aspects of the capital shortage ques-
t ion. There are obviously national 
policy considerations also involved. 
In this regard, I feel there is a pressing 
need to recognize that economic 
growth through private investment 
and savings is as much a national 
priority as are the more politically 
popular human concerns of income 
security, income redistr ibution, con-
sumer rights, environmental safe-
guards and heal th care and 
maintenance—which have been the 
driving force in the rising share of 
government in the economy. 
Also, it is important to recognize 
that the inevitable trade-offs that 
have to be made among these 
competing priorities wil l most likely 
be the final determinants of the 
relative seriousness of our capital 
formation problem. In its concern for 
the well-being of the nation, govern-
ment must not allow the sheer 
volume and momentum of socially 
mandated programs to make severe 
inroads into the rate of capital 
formation in the private sector. In 
turn , private borrowers and lenders 
must face up to their responsibility to 
allocate scarce capital to useful 
purposes and to avoid wasteful 
ventures and frivolous products. 
Economist Paul McCracken sum-
med up the broad policy implications 
of the problem by saying: "The future 
can and wi l l be financed. Our task is 
to improve the probabil ity that the 
future we finance is the future 
citizens generally want." 
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